For Whom The SOL Tolls … and other aspects of the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act

By Heidi M. Wolff-Stanton

The Servicemembers Civil Relief Act (“SCRA”), , 50 U.S.C. §§ 3901 et seq. (initially enacted in 1940 as the Soldiers and Sailors Civil Relief Act, 50 U.S.C. App. §§ 501, et seq.) “relieve[s] servicemembers of many civil burdens while they serve” in the military. Espin v. Citibank, N.A., 126 F.4th 1010, __ [LEXIS *10] (4th Cir. 2025) (citing Gordon v. Pete’s Auto Serv. of Denbigh, Inc., 637 F.3d 454, 457-58 (4th Cir. 2011)). Specifically, the SCRA is intended to “provide for the temporary suspension of judicial and administrative proceedings and transactions that may adversely affect the civil rights of servicemembers during their military service.” 50 U.S.C. § 3902(2).

Of particular significance to legal proceedings, “[t]he period of a servicemember’s military service may not be included in computing any period limited by law, regulation, or order for the bringing of any action or proceeding in a court . . . by or against the servicemember[.]” 50 U.S.C. § 3936(a).

This article will explore what this statute means and how it applies in various situations regarding the tolling of legal deadlines, with particular focus on the statute of limitations.

Relevant statutory definitions

“The term ‘servicemember’ means a member of the uniformed services, as that term is defined in section 101(a)(5) of title 10, United States Code.” 50 U.S.C. § 3911(1).“The term ‘uniformed services’” includes “the armed forces,” 10 U.S.C. § 101(a)(5)(A),1 which in turn is defined as “the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, Space Force, and Coast Guard.” 10 U.S.C. § 101(a)(4).

For members of the armed forces, the term “military service” means “active duty.” 50 U.S.C. § 3911(2)(A)(i), 2 including “any period during which a servicemember is absent from duty on account of sickness, wounds, leave, or other lawful cause.” 50 U.S.C. § 3911(2)(C).2 “The term ‘active duty’ means full-time duty in the active military service of the United States,” including “full-time training duty, annual training duty, and attendance, while in the active military service, at a school designated as a service school by law or by the Secretary of the military department concerned.” 10 U.S.C. § 101(d) (1) (emphasis added).3

“The term ‘period of military service’ means the period beginning on the date on which a servicemember enters military service and ending on the date on which the servicemember is released from military service or dies while in military service.” 50 U.S.C. § 3911(3). “Nothing in either the SCRA or the incorporated portions of 10 U.S.C. § 101 suggests that a servicemember must be deployed or stationed abroad for the SCRA to apply.” Warta v. Porter, McGuire, & Kiakona, LLP, 622 F. Supp. 3d 971, 982 (D. Haw. 2022); accord Cabrera v. Perceptive Software, LLC, 147 F. Supp. 3d 1247, 1250 (D. Kan. 2015) (“Courts have not treated ‘military service’ under the SCRA as the equivalent of deployment; rather, it is . . . defined more broadly than deployment.”).

The SCRA applies to servicemembers as defendants and as plaintiffs

Significantly, given the statutory phrase “by or against the servicemember,” 50 U.S.C. § 3936(a), the SCRA tolling provision can benefit both servicemembers who are plaintiffs and service members who are defendants.

For example, defendants can invoke the SCRA to shield their legal interests with respect to default judgments, mortgage foreclosures, tenant evictions, and redeeming property at tax sales, among other things. See Espin, 126 F.4th at __ [LEXIS *10] (citing Gordon, 637 F.3d at 457-58).

Similarly, plaintiffs can invoke the SCRA to shield their claims from assertions of the statute of limitations. See, e.g., Sedler v. Select Props., Inc., 67 Va. Cir. 515, 516 (Loudoun County Cir. Ct. 2004) (overruling defense’s plea in bar because plaintiff’s “military service tolls the statute of limitations” in his breach of fiduciary duty action); The West Point, 71 F. Supp. 206, 208-09 (E.D. Va. 1947) (the Act applied to statutory requirement for filing of notice of claim for personal injury against municipality such that period in military service was not included in computing time within which such notice could be filed); Cabrera v. Perceptive Software, LLC, 147 F. Supp. 3d 1247, 1250 (D. Kan. 2015) (servicemember’s employment discrimination claims were not time-barred due to his active military service); Murphree v. Communications Techs., Inc., 460 F. Supp. 2d 702, 711 (E.D. La. 2006) (limitations period on servicemember’s state law tort claims did not run during his period of active military service); Cruz v. General Motors Corp., 308 F. Supp. 1052 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (statutes of limitations for state law tort actions were tolled until plaintiff retired from the Navy).

Servicemembers need not show prejudice to claim the benefits of the SCRA

The servicemember is not required to show that military service prejudiced his/her ability to participate in the legal proceedings in order for the SCRA to toll the statute of limitations. See Conroy v. Aniskoff, 507 U.S. 511, 514 (1993) (“The statutory command in [the Act] is unambiguous, unequivocal, and unlimited” and nothing “justif[ied] a departure from the unambiguous statutory text.”); Warta v. Porter, McGuire, & Kiakona, LLP, 622 F. Supp. 3d 971, 983 (D. Haw. 2022) (“Because tolling under the SCRA is unconditional and mandatory, the statute of limitations is still tolled even if the servicemember had actual notice of the claim during his military service.”).

“[T]he servicemember need not show prejudice. The only relevant factor is military service.
Once it is shown, the period of limitations is automatically tolled for the duration of military service.” Sedler v. Select Props., Inc., 67 Va. Cir. 515, 516 (Loudoun County Cir. Ct. 2004) (citing In re A. H. Robins Co., 996 F.2d 716 (4th Cir. 1993); Ricard v. Birch, 529 F.2d 214 (4th Cir. 1975)).

For instance, if the plaintiff qualifies as a servicemember under the Act, then the statute of limitations is automatically tolled. See Kilfoile v. Sherman, 535 S.W.2d 69 (Ky. 1975) (reversing dismissal of servicemember’s personal injury action as time barred); Card v. American Brands Corp., 401 F. Supp. 1186 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (denying motion to dismiss servicemember’s personal injury action as time barred); Lopez v. Waldrum Estate, 249 Ark. 558, 563-64, 460 S.W.2d 61, 65 (Ark. 1970) (personal injury statute of limitations was tolled during the period of plaintiff’s military service).

Likewise, if the defendant is serving in the military, the statute is also tolled. See Ray v. Porter, 464 F.2d 452, 455-56 (6th Cir. 1972) (reversing dismissal of personal injury action against a servicemember as time barred); Henderson v. Miller, 477 S.W.2d 197 (Tenn. 1972) (reversing dismissal of personal injury action against a servicemember as time barred); Bowles v. Dixie Cab Ass’n, 113 F. Supp. 324 (D.D.C. 1953) (denying defendant servicemember’s motion for summary judgment based on the statute of limitations in a personal injury action against him); Kenney v. Churchill Truck Lines, Inc., 6 Ill. App. 3d 983, 992-93, 286 N.E.2d 619, 626 (Ill. Ct. App. 1972) (plaintiff’s wrongful death claim was timely because defendant’s military service tolled limitations period).

As a practical matter, the statute of limitations is paused during military service and resumes running upon cessation of service. See, e.g., Smith v. Sikorsky Aircraft Corp., 41 F. Supp. 3d 564, 571 (S.D. Tex. 2014) (“Plaintiff's injury occurred on January 12, 2009. As of his entry on federal active military duty on July 26, 2009, 194 days of the 730-day statute of limitations had expired. When he separated from active military duty on March 10, 2012, there were 536 days remaining before the statute of limitations expired. That time period expired on August 28, 2013[.]”). Stated otherwise, the time which is tolled is simply not counted (and is omitted from) the running of the limitation period. See DeTemple v. Leica Geosystems, Inc., 576 F. App’x 889, 893 (11th Cir. 2014).

In effect, then, active military members get an extended limitations period. See Van Heest v. Veech, 58 N.J. Super. 427, 431, 156 A.2d 301, 303 (N.J. Law Div. 1959) (“its purpose is merely to extend the time in which an action may be brought by or against a person in military service”); Harris v. Stem, 30 So. 2d 889, 892 (La. Ct. App. 1947) (The applicable one-year limitations period “was plainly interrupted during the services of Harris in the Armed Forces of the United States and his right to bring this suit continued in existence until one year from his [military] discharge.”).

The SCRA merely pauses proceedings; it does not immunize servicemembers

“That a statute of limitations is tolled during a servicemember’s active duty does not mean that an action cannot be commenced by or against the servicemember.” Brandt v. Weyant (In re Brandt), 437 B.R. 294, 305 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 2010). “A party on active duty in the armed forces is entitled to a stay of proceedings . . . but there is no immunity from suit. The . . . period of limitations is automatically tolled for the duration of the [military] service, though an adverse [party] may file sooner if service of process may be had.” Ricard v. Birch, 529 F.2d 214, 217 (4th Cir. 1975).

Furthermore, “[t]he SCRA does not prevent laches from barring a servicemember’s claims, as laches is a limitation on stale claims entirely independent of any applicable statutes of limitations.” Warta v. Porter, McGuire, & Kiakona, LLP, 622 F. Supp. 3d 971, 983 (D. Haw. 2022) (internal quotation marks omitted); accord Cornetta v. United States, 851 F.2d 1372, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 1988); e.g., Taylor v. N.C. Dep’t of Transp., 86 N.C. App. 299, 357 S.E.2d 439 (1987) (plaintiff brought a claim against defendant North Carolina Department of Transportation regarding the taking of rights of way in 1974 as part of a highway project; plaintiff was a servicemember from 1957 until 1983; plaintiff learned of the project in 1976 but failed to bring suit until 1985; the court held that the plaintiff’s claim was not barred by the applicable statute of limitations because it was tolled until plaintiff's retirement from military service in June 1983; but the court held that the plaintiff’s claim was barred by the doctrine of laches).

Being “servicemember-adjacent” does not qualify for protection

Although a servicemember’s family members may also be disrupted by the family member’s military service, “the SCRA has been held to be inapplicable to immediate family members.” Spratt v. Bishop, 2016 Tenn. App. LEXIS 502, at *5 (Tenn. App. 2016) (citing Card v. Am. Brands Corp., 401 F. Supp. 1186, 1187 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (holding that the benefits of the tolling protection of the SCRA “are afforded only to members of the Army, Navy, Marines, Coast Guard and certain public health officers, and no others.”)); accord Lopez v. Waldrum Estate, 249 Ark. 558, 563-64, 460 S.W.2d 61, 63-65 (Ark. 1970) (servicemember’s wife and child do not get the benefit of the SCRA).7

Likewise, persons working alongside or similarly to servicemembers do not get the benefits of the Act. For example, an employee of a private defense contractor that provides services to the United States military is not covered by the Act. See Verhey v. Stewart, 82 Va. Cir. 482, 484 (Fairfax Cir. Ct. 2011); In re Gaddy, 2004 Bankr. LEXIS 1392, 2004 WL 2044107, *3 (Bankr. D. Kan. 2004) (unpublished decision) (“[The Act] clearly does not apply to someone who is simply a civilian employee of a private contractor doing work for the uniformed services of the United States.”).

What if the servicemember is merely a stand-in representative for another?

There is a split of authority regarding whether the Act applies to servicemembers when pursuing claims in a representative capacity. See Dowling v. A.R.T. Inst. of Wash., Inc., 372 F. Supp. 3d 274, 293 (D. Md. 2019) (“where . . . the servicemember brings claims in a representative capacity, the SCRA’s applicability is not as straightforward.”); compare Kerstetter v. United States, 57 F.3d 362, 366 (4th Cir. 1995) (holding that the SCRA did not toll the servicemember’s claims for medical expenses arising from the injuries sustained by his minor daughter in connection with a medical malpractice action) with Wilcox v. Les Schwab Tire Ctrs. of Or., Inc., ., 293 Ore. App. 452, 457, 428 P.3d 900, 903 (2018) (“[T]he SCRA did toll the statute of limitation for plaintiff’s wrongful-death action for the period in which plaintiff was on active duty with the Air Force. As noted, the text of the SCRA does not distinguish between actions brought by servicemembers in an individual capacity and those brought in a representative capacity.”); compare Stutz v. Guardian Cab Corp., 273 A.D. 4, 8, 74 N.Y.S.2d 818, 822 (1st Dep’t 1947) (“Viewing the [wrongful death] action in the present complaint as one to compensate the plaintiff individually as sole next of kin . . .it logically follows that his rights as the real party in interest are protected by the [SCRA] and . . .serve[s] to toll the Statute of Limitations with respect to the cause of action for wrongful death during the time of his military service.”) with McCoy v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. Co., 229 N.C. 57, 61, 47 S.E.2d 532, 535 (1948) (the plaintiff administrator of the estate, in bringing a claim of wrongful death on behalf of the decedent’s estate, cannot benefit from the tolling provisions of the
SCRA).

 

1The term “uniformed services” also includes “the commissioned corps of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration” as well as “the commissioned corps of the Public Health Service.” 10 U.S.C. § 101(a)(5)(B) & (C), respectively.

2 “The term ‘active duty’ means full-time duty in the active military service of the United States,” including “full-time training duty, annual training duty, and attendance, while in the active military service, at a school designated as a service school by law or by the Secretary of the military department concerned.” 10 U.S.C. § 101(d)(1) (emphasis added).

3“[I]n the case of a member of the National Guard,” the term “active duty” “includes service under a call to active service authorized by the President or the Secretary of Defense for a period of more than 30 consecutive days . . . for purposes of responding to a national emergency declared by the President and supported by Federal funds.” 50 U.S.C. § 3911(2)(A)(ii).

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